Here is a copy and past from an article in the Modesto Bee. I spoke at length with the managing editor last month, and I appreciate his article on Neri’s cause. Here is the article, verbatim:
Discredited officer Neri fights back
Jeff Benziger Managing Editor
Long-time Ceres police detective Mark Neri says the Stanislaus County District Attorney’s Office blacklisted him out of police work and is preparing to fight his dismissal.
A 19-year veteran of the Ceres Police Department, Neri was released from duty on March 9, 2009. According to his attorney, Joy Rosenquist of the Goyette law firm in Sacramento, Neri was unjustly placed on what’s known as the Brady List, a list of officers who are deemed not credible in court by district attorneys. The List comes from a 1963 Supreme Court ruling that requires prosecutors to tell defense attorneys about any police officers who may have credibility issues on the witness stand.
Typically an officer is placed on the list, said Rosenquist, based on acts of moral failure, such as embezzlement or fraud. Being on the list meant that the D.A.’s office would not be calling on Neri to testify in cases in which he made an arrest. Placement on the list essentially caused the Ceres Police Department to release him.
“The city could not keep him,” said Rosenquist. “If a detective cannot testify … then he doesn’t have a career.”
Rosenquist said her client was placed on the list “based on junk. Some of it was really stale like a 1993 divorce records.”
Carol Shipley of the Stanislaus County District Attorney’s Office would not comment on the case nor give information on the criteria for placement on the list.
City Attorney Mike Lyions also would not comment on any aspect of the case since Neri’s personnel files are private and releasing them would “be violating his right to privacy.”
“There are some theories of where it came from,” said Rosenquist. “But we’re not sure why the DA’s office took such a hard line against him. They offered him no probation.”
She said the city of Ceres contested Neri’s placement on the Brady List but the District Attorney’s Office stuck by its decision.
Rosenquit said she’s planning a suit against the Stanislaus County District Attorney’s office, preparing a writ to challenge its policies and procedure.
Rosenquist said her client has “a problem” with the way the D.A.’s office sent out a CD with 500 pages of documents relating to Neri’s case to defense attorneys in the area.
She said she will challenge the county’s Brady List procedure and be shown why Neri was added.
“It’s not going to be ending anytime soon,” said Rosenquist.
Neri appealed his termination and underwent a hearing conducted by a three-person panel formed by Lyions. The panel stood by the city’s dismissal of Neri because of his problems with the D.A.’s office.
The Ceres City Council took no action on the matter in an April 13 closed session.
Neri was hired by the Ceres Police Department on Aug. 21, 1995. He was later promoted sergeant on May 10, 2000 but demoted on Aug. 6, 2004. Officials would not say what triggered the demotion.Neri had been placed on administrative leave as the city negotiated with the D.A.’s office but he was eventually terminated.
Rosenquist called her client “a great employee who led to a lot of missing persons discovery.”
Neri has found a job which he hopes is temporary. He’d like his job back.”He’s holding up but he’s basically got his eggs in this basket.”
To read the article at the Modesto Bee:
On June 29th, the Governator signed the new Electronic Discovery Act, which is effective immediately. Just last year, he vetoed an identical version of the act to focus on the budget crisis, I guess he was too busy to veto the same version of the bill, but now it’s law, so here we go. The Act is modeled after the 2006 amendments to the FRCP. The Act is the first significant revision of the civil discovery rules in a few decades and addressed electronically stored information, hot issues right now. For example, if you send a discovery request to Defendant for all documents pertaining to “x,” the Defendant must search all electronically stored information as well, i.e. they have to check their email systems, backup servers, backup tapes, digital forms of storage, etc. It applies really to all civil cases, since almost everything is stored electronically, in some form somewhere, whether we overtly think about it or not. Here are a few bullets of the more notable changes to the rules:
Discovery requests may also be limited when it is: 1)unreasonably cumulative/duplicative; 2) info can be found in a more easily accessible or less expensive source; 3) requesting party had ample opportunity to obtain the information but did not do so (serve requests early in the case to avoid this defense!!); 4) burden and expense of production is outweighed by the expected benefits.
Deputy Jane and Deputy John are married and both work for the Riverside Sheriff’s Department (RSD). Things are not going so well at home lately because Deputy John has been extremely irritable. After a 2 hour argument, Deputy John admits to using methamphetamine; better yet, he is also stealing it from various sources, including crime scenes. He promised to stop and they never spoke of it again. Fast forward almost a year and RSD gets a tip about Deputy John’s theft of methamphetamine from suspects and other deputies. RSD set up a sting and caught Deputy John stealing meth from a staged crime scene. In a criminal investigation which took place that same day, he admitted his drug use, and further admitted he told his wife about it. Also the same day, his wife, Deputy Jane was interviewed and told them her husband had used meth.
Four months later, an administrative investigation was launched. Deputy Jane was present along with her union representative. She invoked her right against self incrimination. She was then ordered to speak and given the Lybarger admonishment. At this point, she finally invoked the marital communication privilege. This privilege basically says that a spouse has a privilege during the marital relationship (and afterwards) to refuse to disclose a communication if he or she claims the privilege and the communication was made in confidence to his or her spouse, while they were married. During this interview, Deputy Jane backtracked on the admissions she made four months earlier and was vague about whether she knew or believed that Deputy John was using meth. Regardless, the RSD issued a reduction in pay for 8 hours, for violation of RSD policy mandating that a supervisor must be informed if a Deputy has committed a criminal offense. She appealed the ruling and went to arbitration, again invoking her marital communication privilege, which the arbitrator honored. The arbitrator reversed her discipline. RSD filed a Writ, which was granted and the Court ordered the arbitrator to reconsider in light of the court’s ruling that marital communication privileges do not apply to law enforcement administrative investigations and hearings.
In its ruling, the Court basically said the marital privilege just isn’t important enough to trump a Deputy’s loyalty to law enforcement and RSD rules. The same rule applies for attorney client privilege. For example, the Courts have ruled that where an Officer’s duties are conflicted between keeping something privileged and informing the law enforcement agency, the conflict must be resolved in favor of his duties to law enforcement, as such officials are the “guardians of peace and security in the community” and therefore are subject to a higher degree of responsibility. In summary, the Court ruled that since the constitutional, fundamental privilege against self incrimination does not apply to law enforcement administrative allegations, then neither does the more narrow and purely statutory marital communication privilege.
Moral of the story? If you are married to a fellow law enforcement officer, watch what you share with each other at home about your day. It can and will be used against you.
(Riverside County Sheriff’s Department v. Louis Zigman, Defendant and Astrid Reynold, Real Party in Interest)
A new case called Paterson v. City of L.A. (CA2/5 B208682) was just issued yesterday and may affect advice to clients, so I thought I’d provide a quick summary:
Appellants Robert and Scarlett Paterson are Los Angeles Police officers, married to each other. In December 2004, R. Paterson called in sick. A supervisor, Lt. Garvin, suspected that he was not sick, but was abusing sick time. Garvin instructed Sgt. Legaspi to go to the Paterson home to find out. Legaspi spoke to both officers, and both were then the subject of internal LAPD misconduct complaints alleging that they had made false and misleading statements to Legaspi. Both were temporarily relieved from duty, but were later exonerated by the Board of Rights. They were reinstated and received back pay for the time of the suspension.
They sued the City of Los Angeles, Legaspi, and others. They sued the City for a POBR violation saying their procedural rights were violated. They also brought tort claims against the City and Legaspi for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent supervision, which depended on factual allegations about these same events. Both the husband and wife officers sought the civil penalty of $25,000 for each violation of the Act, citing section 3309.5, subdivision (e), on malicious violations of the Act; punitive damages; damages for emotional distress; and money damages based on the theory that the award of back pay did not make them financially whole. They also sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the City from allowing its own violations of the Act to have a negative effect on them.
The City and Legaspi moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication. As to the tort causes of action, the motion was based on the doctrines of workers’ compensation exclusivity and governmental immunity. The appellate Court found that the City and Legaspi were entitled to summary adjudication on the tort causes of action, which were barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity. As for the POBR violation, the City contended that the Act only applies where there has been “punitive action,” and that appellants’ exoneration by the Board of Rights nullified any punitive action, so that the Act did not apply. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling of summary adjudication on the cause of action under the Act holding that The Act applies to an investigation and interrogation “that could lead to punitive action . . . .” (§ 3303, italics added.) The City’s nullification theory has no support in the law.
The Appellate court also reversed the trial court’s ruling granting the City summary adjudication on its alternate theory, not raised in the trial court. That theory was that as a matter of law, on the undisputed facts (Brown v. Boren (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1316), Legaspi was engaged only in a “sick check,” in the normal course of duty, and asked only “innocent preliminary and casual questions,” so that the Act did not apply. (§ 3303, subd. (i), City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1514.) The facts at summary judgment are to the contrary, and indicate that Legaspi was engaged in an investigation of suspected wrongdoing.
This is only a brief summary. Here is the decision if you want the details…
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